System and method for protecting secrets file

ABSTRACT

A method for protecting a first secrets file. The method includes an n-bit generator generating a secrets file name for the secrets file and generating a decoy file names for decoy files. The secrets file includes a secret. Each of the decoy files includes decoy file contents, are a same size as the secrets file, and is associated with a modification time within a range of modification times. The modification time of the secrets file is within the range of modification times. The secrets file and decoy files are stored in a secrets directory.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application claims benefit under 35 U.S.C. 120 as acontinuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/203,327, filed onAug. 25, 2011, entitled, “SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROTECTING A SECRETSFILE,” and incorporated herein by reference. U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 13/203,327 claims priority to PCT Application No.PCT/US10/28562 filed on Mar. 25, 2010, entitled, “SYSTEM AND METHOD FORPROTECTING A SECRETS FILE,” and incorporated herein by reference. PCTApplication No. PCT/US10/28562 claims priority to U.S. ProvisionalApplication No. 61/163,406 filed on Mar. 25, 2009 and entitled, “Methodand System for Protecting Secrets Which Provides Security For Computers,Networks, and Information,” and incorporated herein by reference.

BACKGROUND

The computer system assists in managing (e.g., storing, organizing, andcommunicating) a large amount of information. Some of the informationmanaged by a computer system is confidential. In other words, access tosuch information is intended to be limited. Traditional protectionschemes attempt to prevent unauthorized users from accessing theconfidential information by requiring that a user provide authenticationcredential(s), for example a username and password, at a predefinedentry point, to access an account that includes the confidentialinformation. Protecting only the predefined entry points, however, failsto account for nefarious individuals creating other entry points byexploiting computer system vulnerabilities. For example, knowledge of auser's hardware and software system, system configuration, types ofnetwork connections, etc. may be used to create an entry point and gainaccess to the confidential information.

In order to prevent unauthorized access to the confidential information,the confidential information may be encrypted. Encryption is a processof transforming the clear text confidential information into anencrypted format that is unreadable by anyone or anything that does notpossess a corresponding decryption key. An encryption algorithm and anencryption key are used to perform the transformation. Encryptiontechnology is classified into two primary technology types: symmetricencryption technology and asymmetric encryption technology. Symmetricencryption technology uses the same encryption key to both encrypt anddecrypt confidential information. Asymmetric encryption technology usesa pair of corresponding encryption keys: this key pair share arelationship such that data encrypted using one encryption key can onlybe decrypted using the other encryption key of the pair.

SUMMARY

In general, in one aspect, the invention relates to a method forprotecting a first secrets file. The method includes an n-bit generatorgenerating a secrets file name for the secrets file and generating adecoy file names for decoy files. The secrets file includes a secret.Each of the decoy files includes decoy file contents, are a same size asthe secrets file, and is associated with a modification time within arange of modification times. The modification time of the secrets fileis within the range of modification times. The secrets file and decoyfiles are stored in a secrets directory.

In general, in one aspect, the invention relates to a method forencrypting communication. The method includes receiving a request tocommunicate with a group, obtaining a group agreed connect namecorresponding to the group, obtaining a username and password of a userof a member connecting to the group, and generating a first messagedigest using the group agreed connect name, the username, the password,and an n-bit generator. The method further includes extracting a secretsfile name from the first message digest, obtaining an encrypted secretsfile from a secrets directory, decrypting the encrypted secrets file toobtain a secrets file using a secrets file encryption key obtained fromthe first message digest, generating a second message digest using then-bit generator and a first secret and a second secret from the secretsfile, and encrypting communication between the member and the groupusing an encryption key obtained, at least in part, from the secondmessage digest.

In general, in one aspect, the invention relates to a computing devicefor protecting a secrets file that includes a processor, a memory, andsoftware instructions stored in memory. The software instructions causethe computing device to generate a secrets file name for the secretsfile and generating a decoy file names for decoy files. The secrets fileincludes a secret. Each of the decoy files includes decoy file contents,are a same size as the secrets file, and is associated with amodification time within a range of modification times. The modificationtime of the secrets file is within the range of modification times. Thesecrets file and decoy files are stored in a secrets directory.

In general, in one aspect, the invention relates to a computing devicefor protecting a secrets file that includes a processor, a memory, andsoftware instructions stored in memory. The software instructions causethe computing device to receive a request to communicate with a group,obtain a group agreed connect name corresponding to the group, obtain ausername and password of a user of a member connecting to the group, andgenerate a first message digest using the group agreed connect name, theusername, the password, and an n-bit generator. The softwareinstructions further cause the computing device to extract a secretsfile name from the first message digest, obtain an encrypted secretsfile from a secrets directory, decrypt the encrypted secrets file toobtain a secrets file using a secrets file encryption key obtained fromthe first message digest, generate a second message digest using then-bit generator and a first secret and a second secret from the secretsfile, and encrypt communication between the member and the group usingan encryption key obtained, at least in part, from the second messagedigest.

In general, in one aspect, the invention relates to a computer readablemedium comprising computer readable program code embodied therein forcausing a computer system to perform a method for protecting a firstsecrets file. The method includes an n-bit generator generating asecrets file name for the secrets file and generating a decoy file namesfor decoy files. The secrets file includes a secret. Each of the decoyfiles includes decoy file contents, are a same size as the secrets file,and is associated with a modification time within a range ofmodification times. The modification time of the secrets file is withinthe range of modification times. The secrets file and decoy files arestored in a secrets directory.

In general, in one aspect, the invention relates to a computer readablemedium comprising computer readable program code embodied therein forcausing a computer system to perform a method for protecting a firstsecrets file. The method includes receiving a request to communicatewith a group, obtaining a group agreed connect name corresponding to thegroup, obtaining a username and password of a user of a memberconnecting to the group, and generating a first message digest using thegroup agreed connect name, the username, the password, and an n-bitgenerator. The method further includes extracting a secrets file namefrom the first message digest, obtaining an encrypted secrets file froma secrets directory, decrypting the encrypted secrets file to obtain asecrets file using a secrets file encryption key obtained from the firstmessage digest, generating a second message digest using the n-bitgenerator and a first secret and a second secret from the secrets file,and encrypting communication between the member and the group using anencryption key obtained, at least in part, from the second messagedigest.

Other aspects of the invention will be apparent from the followingdescription and the appended claims.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a system in accordance with one ormore embodiments of the invention.

FIGS. 2A-5B show flowcharts in accordance with one or more embodimentsof the invention.

FIGS. 6A-7E show examples in accordance with one or more embodiments ofthe invention.

FIG. 8 shows a computing device in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Specific embodiments of the invention will now be described in detailwith reference to the accompanying figures. Like elements in the variousfigures are denoted by like reference numerals for consistency.

In the following detailed description of embodiments of the invention,numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a morethorough understanding of the invention. However, it will be apparent toone of ordinary skill in the art that the invention may be practicedwithout these specific details. In other instances, well-known featureshave not been described in detail to avoid unnecessarily complicatingthe description.

In general, embodiments of the invention relate to securingcommunication between members of a group, where each member is acomputing device. In one or more embodiments of the invention, the groupis two or more members that share (or intend to share) confidentialinformation. The confidential information may be transmitted ascommunication (or portion thereof). Examples of communications include,but are not limited to, short messaging service (SMS) messages,electronic mail (e-mail), chat messages, audio messages, graphics,audio-visual messages (e.g., video file, streaming video, etc.). As usedherein, a communication is encrypted when at least a portion of thecommunication is encrypted.

In one embodiment of the invention, a computing device is any physicalor virtual device that may be used to perform embodiments of theinvention. The physical device may correspond to any physical systemwith functionality to implement one or more embodiments of theinvention. For example, the physical device may be implemented on ageneral purpose computing device (i.e., a device with a processor(s) andan operating system) such as, but not limited to, a desktop computer, alaptop computer, a gaming console, a mobile device (e.g., smart phone, apersonal digital assistant, gaming device).

Alternatively, the physical device may be a special purpose computingdevice that includes an application-specific processor(s)/hardwareconfigured to only execute embodiments of the invention. In such cases,the physical device may implement embodiments of the invention inhardware as a family of circuits and limited functionality to receiveinput and generate output in accordance with various embodiments of theinvention. In addition, such computing devices may use a state-machineto implement various embodiments of the invention.

In another embodiment of the invention, the physical device maycorrespond to a computing device that include both a general purposesprocessor(s) and an application-specific processor(s)/hardware. In suchcases, one or more portions of the invention may be implemented usingthe operating system and general purpose processor(s) and one or moreportions of the invention may be implemented using theapplication-specific processor(s)/hardware.

The virtual device may correspond to a virtual machine. Broadlyspeaking, the virtual machines are distinct operating environmentsconfigured to inherit underlying functionality of the host operatingsystem (and access to the underlying host hardware) via an abstractionlayer. In one or more embodiments of the invention, a virtual machineincludes a separate instance of an operating system, which is distinctfrom the host operating system. For example, one or more embodiments ofthe invention may be implemented on VMware® architectures involving: (i)one or more virtual machines executing on a host computer system suchthat each virtual machine serves as host to an instance of a guestoperating system; and (ii) a hypervisor layer serving to facilitateintra-host communication between the one or more virtual machines andhost computer system hardware. Alternatively, one or more embodiments ofthe invention may be implemented on Xen® architectures involving: (i) acontrol host operating system (e.g., Dom 0) including a hypervisor; and(ii) one or more VMs (e.g., Dom U) executing guest operating systeminstances. The invention is not limited to the aforementioned exemplaryarchitectures VMware® is a registered trademark of VMware, Inc. Xen® isa trademark overseen by the Xen Project Advisory Board.

Each of the members may be used by, for example, an individual, abusiness entity, a family, any other entity, or any combination thereof.For example, a group may have members John Smith's computing device andJane Doe's computing device. As another example, a group may havemembers John Smith's smart phone, John Smith's personal computer, andJohn Smith's gaming console. As another example, a group may havemembers John Smith's computing device, Jane Smith's computing device,and the servers of the Smith's financial advisors. Other possible groupsmay exist without departing from the scope of the invention.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, each member creates asecrets file that has secret(s). The name of the secrets file and thesecret is generated by an n-bit generator. The secret(s) is used tosecure communications between the members of the group. The n-bitgenerator also generates decoy file names and decoy file contents fordecoy files. The decoy files and the secrets file are stored together inthe same secrets directory. Thus, the secrets file is indistinguishablefrom the decoy files. Whenever the secrets file is updated, each of thedecoy files are also updated such that the secrets file remainsindistinguishable from the decoy files.

FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a system in accordance with one ormore embodiments of the invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the systemincludes a security application (102) and a security directory (104).Both of these components are discussed below.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, each member includes asecurity application (102). The security application (102) on eachmember may be instances of the same application, different versions ofthe same application, or different applications. Further, the securityapplication may correspond to a complete program product or aprogramming module of another application. For example, the securityapplication may be a part of and provide security for banking and/orcommerce applications. In one or more embodiments of the invention, thesecurity application (102) includes an n-bit generator (106), anencryption module (108), and a user interface (110). Each of thecomponents of the security application (102) may be implemented inhardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. The componentsof the security application are discussed below.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, an n-bit generator (106)includes functionality to receive and process one or more inputs togenerate a message digest. A message digest is a string of characters,which may be represented as a bit-string, in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the invention. In one or more embodiments of theinvention, the message digest is a bit string. Further, the n-bitgenerator includes functionality to generate a deterministic andrepeatable message digest, which appears pseudo-random or random, inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the invention. Apseudo-random output (e.g., message digest) is output that is repeatableand predictable but appears random. Specifically, in one or moreembodiments of the invention, although the message digest is repeatableand calculable when the inputs and the operations performed by the n-bitgenerator (106) are known, the message digest appears random. Theapparent randomness may be with respect to someone who knows or does notknow the inputs in accordance with one or more embodiments of theinvention. Alternatively, or additionally, the apparent randomness maybe with respect to someone who does not know the operations performed bythe n-bit generator in accordance with one or more embodiments of theinvention. In one or more embodiments of the invention, the messagedigest is deterministic in that a single output exists for a given setof inputs. Moreover, the message digest may be a fixed length. In otherwords, regardless of the input length, the same n-bit generator (106)may produce a message digest with a fixed length.

The number of bits in the input to the n-bit generator may be differentor the same as the number of bits in the output produced by the n-bitgenerator. For example, if the n-bit generator accepts n number of bitsfor input and produces m number of bits for output, m may be less than,equal to, or greater than n. Multiple iterations of the n-bit generatormay be performed to construct an ever-increasing m-bit result thatincludes multiple message digests.

Further, the n-bit generator (106) includes functionality to generate adeterministic message digest. Specifically, the n-bit generator (106)has the following two properties. First, the n-bit generator (106)generates the same message digest when provided with the same input(s).Second, the n-bit generator generates, with a high probability, adifferent message digest when provided with different input(s). Forexample, a single bit change in the input may result in a significantchange of the bits in the resulting message digest. In the example, thechange may be fifty percent of the bits depending on the type of n-bitgenerator used. However, a greater percentage or less percentage of bitsmay change without departing from the scope of the invention.

The n-bit generator (106) may include multiple sub-routines, such as abit shuffler (not shown) and a hash function (not shown). In one or moreembodiments of the invention, the bit shuffler includes functionality tocombine multiple inputs into a single output. Specifically, the bitshuffler applies a function to the bit level representation of inputs togenerate a resulting set of output bits. The output of the bit shufflermay appear as a shuffling of bits in each of inputs and may or may nothave the same ratio of 1's to 0's as the input. In one or moreembodiments of the invention, the bit shuffling by the bit shuffler hasa commutative property. In other words, the order that inputs areprovided to the bit shuffler does not affect the output. For example,consider the scenario in which the inputs are input X, input Y, andinput Z. Bit shuffling on input X, input Y, and input Z produces thesame output as bit shuffling on input Y, input Z, and input X.

In one embodiment of the invention, the bit shuffler may correspond toany function or series of functions for combining inputs. For example,the bit shuffler may correspond to the XOR function, the multiplicationfunction, an addition function, or another function that may be used tocombine inputs. As another example, the security application with thebit shuffler may correspond to a function that orders the inputs andthen uses a non-commutative function to generate an output. The bitshuffler may correspond to other mechanisms for combining multipleinputs without departing from the scope of the invention.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, a hash function is afunction that includes functionality to receive an input and produce apseudo-random output. In one or more embodiments of the invention, thehash function may include functionality to convert a variable lengthinput into a fixed length output. For example, the hash function maycorrespond to GOST, HAVAL, MD2, MD4, MD5, PANAMA, SNEERU, a member ofthe RIPEMD family of hash functions, a member of the SHA family of hashfunctions, Tiger, Whirlpool, S-Box, P-Box, any other hash function, orcombination thereof.

Although the above description discusses the use of the bit shufflerprior to the hash function, in one or more embodiments of the invention,the hash function operations may be performed prior to the bit shuffleroperations. For example, the hash function may be performed separatelyon each of the inputs to create hashed inputs. The hashed inputs maythen be combined by the bit shuffler. Alternatively, the bit shufflermay be first performed on the inputs to create a single intermediateresult before the intermediate result is provided to the hash function.The intermediate result may be stored to be used later to createsubsequent message digests.

Further, in one or more embodiments of the invention, the n-bitgenerator includes a random character generator, such as a random numbergenerator. The random character generator includes functionality togenerate a random string of characters of a specified length. The n-bitgenerator may use the random character generator, for example, togenerate the decoy file names (e.g., 134A, 134X) and/or the decoy data(e.g., 132A, 132X).

The n-bit generator (106) is operatively connected to an encryptionmodule (108) in accordance with one or more embodiments of theinvention. An encryption module (108) includes functionality to managethe encryption and decryption of information for the computing device.Specifically, the encryption module (108) includes functionality torequest generation of a secrets file (112) (discussed below) and decoyfiles (e.g., 114A, 114X) (discussed below). The encryption module (108)may further include functionality to update files in the securitydirectory (104) (discussed below) so that all files in the secretsdirectory (104) appear indistinguishable from each other.

For example, the encryption module may include functionality to receiveinformation, request one or more message digests from the n-bitgenerator (106), extract an encryption key from the one or more messagedigests, and/or encrypt the information using the encryption key.Alternatively, or additionally, the encryption module (108) may includefunctionality to receive encrypted information, request one or moremessage digests from the n-bit generator (106), extract an encryptionkey from the one or more message digests, and/or decrypt the encryptedinformation using the encryption key.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, the encryption module (108)is identically configured across all members of a group to request thesame number of message digests. The configuration may be based, forexample, on the type of communication, the encryption algorithm, and/orthe type of data to be extracted from the message digest.

The encryption module (108) implements one or more encryptionalgorithms. In one or more embodiments of the invention, the encryptionalgorithm includes functionality to transform information in a cleartext format into an encrypted format that is unreadable by anyone oranything that does not possess a corresponding encryption key. Forexample, the encryption algorithm may correspond to Data EncryptionAlgorithm (DEA) specified in the Data Encryption Standard (DES), TripleDES, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FEAL, SKIPJACK, any otherencryption algorithm, or any combination thereof. In one or moreembodiments of the invention, the encryption module implements onlysymmetric encryption algorithm(s).

Although not shown in FIG. 1, the encryption module (108) may alsoinclude or be operatively connected to an algorithm selector table (notshown). An algorithm selector table is a logical association betweenencryption algorithms and an algorithm identifier. The algorithmidentifier may be, for example, a numeric, binary, or another suchvalue. In one or more embodiments of the invention, all algorithmidentifiers in a range are present. For example, the algorithmidentifier may be a range of integers (e.g., 0 . . . 15), a sequence ofbinary values (e.g., 000, 001, 010, . . . 111). Further, the sameencryption algorithm may be associated with multiple algorithmidentifiers in the table. For example, “0” may correspond to AES, “1”may correspond to Triple DES, “2” may correspond FEAL, and “3” maycorrespond to Triple DES. The use of the term, “table”, is only todenote a logical representation, various data structures may be used toimplement the algorithm selector table without departing from the scopeof the invention.

Further, in one or more embodiments of the invention, the associationbetween the encryption algorithm identifiers and the encryptionalgorithms is not based on a pre-defined ordering of encryptionalgorithms. Specifically, the association may be randomly defined.

The use of the term, “table”, is only to denote a logicalrepresentation; various implementations of the algorithm selector tablemay be used without departing from the scope of the invention. Forexample, the algorithm selector table may be implemented in computerinstructions using a series of conditional statements. Specifically,when a conditional statement is satisfied, the code corresponding to theimplementation of the encryption algorithm is executed. By way ofanother example, the algorithm selector table may be implemented as adata structure that associates the consecutive encryption algorithmidentifiers with identifiers used by the security application for eachof the encryption algorithms. The above are only a few examples ofpossible implementations for the algorithm selector table and notintended to limit the scope of the invention.

Further, all members associate the same encryption algorithm identifierswith the same corresponding encryption algorithms. For example, if onemember associates “0” with AES, “1” with Triple DES, “2” with FEAL, and“3” with Triple DES, then the remaining members associates “0” with AES,“1” with Triple DES, “2” with FEAL, and “3” with Triple DES. Further,all members may or may not use the same implementation of the algorithmselector table.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, the algorithm selectortable includes separate entries for each encryption algorithm and keylength pair. In one or more embodiments of the invention, the encryptionmodule may identify the encryption algorithm from the algorithm selectortable and use the key length associated with the encryption algorithm toextract the appropriate number of bits for the encryption key. Forexample, an entry may exist for Blowfish with an encryption key length256 bits and a separate entry may exist for Blowfish with an encryptionkey length of 384 bits. In the example, if the first entry is specifiedin the algorithm selector bits of the message digest (discussed below),then 256 bits are extracted from the message digest(s) for theencryption key. Alternatively, in the example, if the second entry isspecified, then 384 bits are extracted from the message digest for theencryption key.

Further, each entry in the algorithm selector table may include astarting bit value. The starting bit value may be used to identify afirst secret to use in the secrets repository or a starting bit for theencryption key in the message digest.

Alternatively, although not shown in FIG. 1, the system may include akey length table. The key length table may specify an identifier with acorresponding encryption key length. Similar to the algorithm selectortable, multiple different possible implementations of the key lengthtable may be used without departing from the scope of the invention.Further, all members of the group have the associations between keylength identifiers and key lengths, but may not have the sameimplementation of key length table. For example, “1” may be associatedwith “256 bits”, 2 may be associated with “128 bits”, etc.

In one or more embodiment of the invention, when a key length table isused, the algorithm selector table may be used to specify the encryptionalgorithm, and the key length table may be used to specify the number ofbits in the encryption key. Specifically, a key length field (discussedbelow) in the message digest may index the corresponding entry in thekey length table. In one or more embodiments of the invention, if thespecified encryption algorithm does not allow for variable key length,then the key length field in the message digest is ignored.

Continuing with the security application (102), in one or moreembodiments of the invention, the user interface (110) includesfunctionality to communicate with a user of the computing device. Forexample, the user interface (110) may include functionality to guide auser through configuring the security application to communicate withone or more groups of which the computing device is a member. Further,the user interface (110) may include functionality to inform a user whenanother member of a group is requesting communication and provide theuser with the option of allowing the communication with the user'scomputing device. The user interface (110) may include hardware and/orsoftware components, such as information boxes, menu buttons, drop downboxes, input boxes, hardware lights, hardware buttons, and/or other userinterface components.

Although not shown in FIG. 1, the security application may include anapplication programming interface (API). The security application may beconfigured to communicate with other applications executing on the sameor different computing devices using the API. Thus, for example, the APIof member A may include functionality to communicate via the networkwith member B's security application. As another example, the API mayinclude functionality to receive an encrypted format of a file andprovide a clear text format of the file to another application executingon member A. Conversely, the API may include functionality to receive,from another application on member A, a clear text format of a file andprovide an encrypted format of the file to another application executingon member A on member B.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, the security application(102) includes functionality to access and use a security directory(104). A security directory (104) is located within a file system forstorage of the secrets file (112) and the decoy files (e.g., 114A,114X). Alternatively, the file system merely includes an access pointfor the security directory, which is stored on an external physicalstorage medium that is accessible via the file system (e.g., theexternal physical storage medium is mounted to the file system). In oneor more embodiments of the invention, the security directory (104) doesnot include any partitioning (e.g., in the form of subdirectories orsubfolders) of the secrets file (112) and the decoy files (e.g., 114A,114X). Further, in one or more embodiments of the invention, secretsfiles (112) and decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X) generated for differentgroups of users are not partitioned in the security directory (104).Alternatively, the security directory (104) may include a partitioningof files for each group of which the user is a member.

In one embodiment of the invention, the secrets directory (104) (orportions thereof) is located on an external device that is accessible tothe security application. Examples of external devices include, but arenot limited to, a mobile phone, a smart phone, a personal digitalassistant, a portable gaming device, a memory device (e.g., any devicewith non-volatile memory) with a contactless interface (e.g., aBlueTooth Interface), a memory device (e.g., any device withnon-volatile memory) with a contact interface (e.g., a Universal SerialBus (USB) interface), etc.

Although FIG. 1 shows the security directory (104) as only including thesecrets file (112) and the decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X), the securitydirectory (104) may include other files without departing from the scopeof the invention. For example, the security directory (104) may includegeneral files for the member, general files for a computer system (notshown) connected to the member, configuration files for the securityapplication (102), and/or any other files. Further, the other files mayor may not be in the same partition in the security directory as thesecrets file (112) and the decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X).

The secrets file (112) is a file for storing secrets (118). Secrets inthe secrets file (112) are shared secrets. Shared secrets (118)correspond to data known only to the members of the group. Specifically,the security application (102) of each member of the group independentlygenerates the secrets (118) using an n-bit generator (106) and the samegroup agreed seed as inputs to the n-bit generator (106). The groupagreed seed may be any password, passphrase, or series of charactersagreed upon by members of the group or their corresponding users. Forexample, the group agreed seed may be “the cow jumped over the moon,”“#8$# DsaVA(@12w@,” or any other collection of characters (e.g., symbolsand/or alphanumeric characters).

In one or more embodiments of the invention, because each secret isgenerated by the n-bit generator (106), each secret is pseudo-random.For example, when interpreted in textual-based format, each secretappears as random string of characters (e.g., ASCII symbols or any othercharacter set used to represent characters).

In one or more embodiments of the invention, each security applicationgenerates the same set of secrets (118). Each secret (118) in thesecrets file may be associated with a unique secret identifier. Theunique secret identifier may be a consecutive integer specifying whenthe secret was generated. For example, the first generated secret may beassociated with the number one, while the second generated may beassociated with the number two, etc. The consecutive integer may beexplicitly or implicitly associated with the secret. For example, thenumber one may be stored in the secrets file (112) with the firstgenerated secret. Alternatively, the first generated secret may be inthe first position in the secrets file to indirectly associate the firstgenerated secret with the first integer.

Secrets (118) in the secrets file (112) are each associated with a givengroup and may be further organized according to type of communication inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the invention. For example,secrets used for encryption in a chat session may be different thansecrets used for encryption in an email communication. Alternatively oradditionally, the secrets may be organized based on the clear text fileformat of a file to be encrypted. For example, secrets used to encryptportable document formatted (PDF) files may be different than secretsused to encrypt extensible markup language (XML) files.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, each shared secret mayinclude a static secret, a dynamic secret, or both a static secret and adynamic secret. The static secret may remain unchanged throughout thelifetime of the group in accordance with one or more embodiments of theinvention. For example, the static secret may be used to recover securecommunications by providing a new set of secrets when the members of thegroup lose synchronization with regards to the dynamic secrets. Incontrast, the dynamic secret may periodically change, such as at the endof each communication session or prior to beginning a communicationsession.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, a communication session maybe a set of related communications (e.g., related short messagingservice messages (SMS), related emails, chat messages, or other relatedcommunications). Alternatively, or additionally, a communication sessionmay correspond to a set of communications starting at a first time andhaving a duration of a pre-defined amount of time. The pre-definedamount of time may be defined, for example, according to the amount oftime after the last communication is sent and/or received.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, secrets (118) are protectedin the secrets file. The protection of the secrets (118) may beperformed by encrypting the file. Specifically, the secrets file (112)may have an encryption key (not shown) associated with the secrets file(112), such that only the encryption module (108) can decrypt the file.Protection may further include making the secrets (118) inaccessible tothe member having the secrets directory (104). Specifically, the member(or user of the member) may be unable to identify the secrets (118) oreven the secrets file (112). By hiding the secrets (118) even from themember (and the user of the member) having the security application(102) and the security directory (104), the secrets (118) are highlyunlikely to be compromised by the member (or the user of the member).

In addition to secrets (118), the secrets file (112) also includesecrets file metadata (116). The secrets file metadata (116) includesinformation about the secrets file (112). As shown in FIG. 1, thesecrets file metadata (116) may include a file name (120), a createdtimestamp (122), an accessed timestamp (124), a modified timestamp(126), and a file size (128).

The file name (120) is the unique identifier of the file within thesecurity directory (104). In one or more embodiments of the invention,the file name appears randomly generated. Specifically, the file name(120) is a pseudo-random string of characters (e.g., symbols and/oralphanumeric characters) of a pre-defined length. The file name may begenerated by the n-bit generator and may be converted to textual basedformat.

The created timestamp (122) specifies when the secrets file (112) wascreated. If the secrets file (112) is a copy of an original secrets file(112), then the created timestamp specifies when the copy was created.Similarly, the accessed timestamp specifies when the secrets file (112)was last accessed by the user or the program. For example, the accessedtimestamp may correspond to the last time in which the secrets file(112) was opened. The modified timestamp (126) specifies when thesecrets file (112) was last modified. Specifically, the modifiedtimestamp (126) specifies when a change was saved to the secrets file(112). The file size (128) provides the size of the secrets file (112).Specifically, the file size (128) may specify, for example, the amountof physical storage space required to store the secrets file.

In addition to the secrets file (112), the security directory (104) alsoincludes decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X) in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the invention. In one or more embodiments of theinvention, the decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X) are indistinguishable fromthe secrets file (112). Specifically, like the secrets file (112), thedecoy files include metadata (e.g., 130A, 130X) [130X was omitted fromFIG. 1] and data (e.g., 132A, 132X). The decoy file metadata (e.g.,130A, 130X) may include a file name (e.g., 134A, 134X), a createdtimestamp (e.g., 136A, 136X), accessed timestamp (e.g., 138A, 138X),modified timestamp (e.g., 140A, 140X), and file size (e.g., 142A, 142X).

In one or more embodiments of the invention, the file name (e.g., 134A,134X) of the decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X) are similar to the file name(120) of the secrets file (112). Specifically, like the secrets filename (120), the decoy file name (e.g., 134A, 134X) is a pseudo-randomstring of characters. Further, the decoy file name (e.g., 134A, 134X)includes only characters that may be present in the secrets file name(120). For example, if the secrets file name (120) includes onlyalphanumeric characters, then the decoy file names (e.g., 134A, 134X)also only include alphanumeric characters. Thus, the secrets file name(120) appears indistinguishable from the decoy file name (e.g., 114A,114X).

Further, in one or more embodiments of the invention, the createdtimestamp (e.g., 136A, 136X), the accessed timestamp (e.g., 138A, 138X),the modified timestamp (e.g., 140A, 140X), and the file size (e.g.,142A, 142X) of the decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X) are identical tocreated timestamp (122), accessed timestamp (124), modified timestamp(126), and the file size (128) of the secrets file (112). Rather thanbeing completely identical, the aforementioned components may besubstantially identical (e.g., have only a difference of a few secondsor millisecond). Moreover, the values of the aforementioned componentsof the secrets file (112) are within the range of values of theaforementioned components of the various decoy files (e.g., 114A, 114X).For example, if the modified timestamp of the secrets file is 10:21:45AM on Aug. 1, 2010, the modified timestamp of the decoy files may rangefrom 10:21:36 AM on Aug. 1, 2010 to 10:21:59 AM on Aug. 1, 2010. Abroader range of timestamps may exist without departing from the scopeof the invention.

Similar to the file name (e.g., 134A, 134X) of the decoy files (e.g.,114A, 114X) and the file name (120) of the secrets file (112), the decoydata (e.g., 132A, 132X) appear indistinguishable to the secrets (118).In particular, the decoy data (e.g., 132A, 132X) has the same apparentrandomization of characters as the secrets. Further, if the secrets fileis partitioned into secrets (e.g., static and dynamic secrets), then thedecoy data is also partitioned into strings of the same number ofcharacters as the secrets. Similarly, if the secrets file includesidentifiers, then the decoy data also includes similar identifiers.Thus, the decoy data (e.g., 132A, 132X) includes the same amount, sameidentifier, same file structure and the same apparent randomization ofcharacters as the secrets (118) in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the invention. The decoy data (e.g., 132A, 132X) may beencrypted, for example, using the same encryption algorithm to encryptthe secrets (118).

Although FIG. 1 shows the secrets file (112) as the first file, thesecrets file (112) may be intermingled between the decoy files (e.g.,114A, 114X). For example, the ordering of the files within the secretsdirectory does not account for fact that the secrets file is a secretsfile. Thus, the secrets file (112) is not in a pre-defined positionwithin the secrets directory.

Further, a portion of the security application (102) may be remote fromthe computing device. For example, a portion of the security applicationmay be stored on an external storage device. As another example, anexternal device that is connected to the computing device may beconfigured to process and display a user interface for the securityapplication (102) executing on the computing device.

Further, the metadata shown in FIG. 1 may be only a portion of themetadata (e.g., 116, 130A, 130X) that is manipulated to be identical orsubstantially identical for the secrets file (112) and the decoy files(e.g., 114A, 114X). Specifically, the secrets file (112) and the decoyfiles (e.g., 114A, 114X) may include additional metadata withoutdeparting from the scope of the invention. Further, the additionalmetadata may or may not be updated to be identical or substantiallyidentical without departing from the scope of the invention. Forexample, if the metadata includes the file creator, then the secretsfile and decoy files are forced to have the same file creator inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the invention. In theexample, the file creator may be the user or a pre-specified name.

FIGS. 2A-5B show flowcharts in accordance with one or more embodimentsof the invention. While the various steps in these flowcharts arepresented and described sequentially, one of ordinary skill willappreciate that some or all of the steps may be executed in differentorders, may be combined or omitted, and some or all of the steps may beexecuted in parallel. Further, in the following flowcharts, a member ofthe group is deemed to perform the actions when the security applicationof the member performs the actions on behalf of the member.

FIGS. 2A-2B show a flowchart for configuring the security application inaccordance with one or more embodiments of the invention. As shown inFIG. 2A, in Step 201, execution of a configuration utility in thesecurity application is started. In one or more embodiments of theinvention, the first time that a user starts the security application,the configuration utility is started. Further, in one or moreembodiments of the invention, the user may use the configuration utilityafter the first configuration, such as to add additional groups. Asdiscussed below, the configuration utility may guide the user throughconfiguring the security application to communicate with the groups ofwhich the user's computing device is a member. Those skilled in the artwill appreciate that a process executing on the computing device mayinitiate the configuration of the security instead of the user.

Continuing with FIG. 2A, in Step 203, the security application receivesnew user credentials. In one or more embodiments of the invention, thenew user credentials may include, for example, a username and password.Other forms of user credentials may be used without departing from thescope of the invention. After the user provides the new usercredentials, the user may be required later to use the providedcredentials to use the security application.

Alternatively, rather than the user providing new user credentials inStep 203, the security application may be pre-configured with usercredentials. For example, consider the scenario in which the securityapplication is provided to the user by a business entity thatpre-associates the security application with user credentials. In such ascenario, the user in Step 203 may be requested to provide thepre-associated credentials in order to configure the securityapplication.

Continuing with FIG. 2A, in Step 205, a configuration of a new group isinitiated. For example, a user may select a menu option or softwarebutton to indicate that the user would like to add a new group.Alternatively or additionally, the configuration may be based on theuser receiving an invite via the security application. The user may beinvited by other members to the group. For example, consider thescenario in which the user is an employee of a company. An administratorof the company may trigger the administrator's security application tosend, to the employee's work computer, an invitation to join the group.Based on the invite, the security application on the employees workcomputer starts the configuration of the new group.

In Step 207, the name of the group is received. In one or moreembodiments of the invention, the user provides a nickname for thegroup. The user may provide a name that the user is capable ofremembering. For example, the name may be the names of the users whohave computing devices that are members of the group. For example, ifJohn's computing device, Angie's computing device, and Joe's computingdevice are members, then the group name may be John-Angie-Joe. Further,in one or more embodiments of the invention, the names arealphabetically ordered. For example, the group name may beAngie-Joe-John. Rather than using names associated with the members ofthe group, the group name may be a description of the group (e.g.,“financial management team,” “work group,” “lawsuit strategy team,”etc.).

In Step 209, a group agreed connect name for the new group is received.In one or more embodiments of the invention, a group agreed connect nameis an identifier of the group used by all of the members. Specifically,each member of the group associates the same group agreed connect namewith the group. Thus, whereas the name of the group in Step 207 may be aname used by a single member, the group agreed connect name is anidentifier shared by all members. Further, the group agreed connect namemay be an alphanumeric value which would be very difficult to memorize.Because all members associate the same group with the same group agreedconnect name, the group agreed connect name may be used by a member ofthe group when triggering the start of a communication session withother members of the group. For example, consider the scenario in whichgroup A includes Angie's computing device, Joe's computing device, andJohn's computing device, and has a connect name of 32. Group B includesonly Joe's computing device and Angie's computing device, and hasconnect name 43. In the scenario, Joe's computing device may startcommunication with the Group A by using connect name 32. Thus, Angie'scomputing device uses the correct set of secrets for Group A.

The group may agree on a group agreed connect name by using anegotiation protocol. For example, one or more members may broadcast aproposed connect name, which is either accepted or rejected by the othergroup members. If all members agree, then the agreed proposed connectname may be a group agreed connect name. Alternatively, the group agreedconnect name may be assigned. For example, an administrator of thegroup, who may or may not be a member, may assign the group agreedconnect name to the group. As another example, users of the members maycommunicate the group agreed connect name in person, over the phone, viapostal mail, or using any other alternative communication channel.

In Step 211, a first message digest is generated using the group agreedconnect name and the user credentials as inputs into the n-bitgenerator. Specifically, the encryption module calls the n-bit generatorusing the group agreed connect name and the user credentials as theinput values. The n-bit generator generates the first message digest byapplying the operations of the n-bit generator (discussed above) to theinput values.

In Step 213, a secrets file name and a secrets file encryption key isextracted from the first message digest. Specifically, the encryptionmodule identifies each portion of the message digest corresponding to asecrets file name and a secrets file encryption key. For example, in a512-bit message digest, bits in bit positions 0-255 may correspond tothe secrets file name, bits in bit positions corresponding to 256-383may correspond to the secrets file encryption key, and the final 128bits may correspond to discard bits that remain unused. In the example,the security application extracts the secrets file name by obtaining0-255 bits and extracts the secrets file encryption key by obtaining thenext 128 bits. In one or more embodiments of the invention, because theuser credentials are part of the input in Step 211, with a highprobability, a different message digest is generated by each member ofthe group. Thus, the secrets file name and the secrets file encryptionkey are different for each member of the group. Thus, a nefariousindividual or computer system cannot correlate file names on differentmembers to identify the secrets file or decrypt an encrypted secretsfile using a secrets file encryption key generated by another member.

In Step 215, a determination is made whether a file naming conflictexists in the security directory. Specifically, a determination is madewhether the file name matches an existing file name in the securitydirectory. If a file naming conflict exists, the naming conflict iscorrected in Step 217. Different techniques may be used to correct thenaming conflict. For example, the member having the naming conflict mayrequest that a new group agreed connect name is used. The new groupagreed connect name may be generated by incrementing or appending avalue on the previous group agreed connect name or repeating Step 209.Other methods to correct the naming conflict may be used withoutdeparting from the scope of the invention.

Continuing with FIG. 2B, in Step 219, regardless of whether a namingconflict exists, a group agreed seed is received for the secrets file.Specifically, the members of the group and/or their corresponding userscommunicate and agree on a group agreed seed. If the users communicateand agree on the group agreed seed, then the user may submit the groupagreed seed to the security application. In such embodiments, thesecurity application obtains the group agreed seed from the member. Ifthe members communicate with the other members regarding the groupagreed seed, then the member obtains the group agreed seed as the oneagreed upon. The group agreed seed may be any password, passphrase, orseries of characters. For example, the group agreed seed may be “the cowjumped over the moon,” “#8$# DsaVA(@ 12w@,” or any other collection ofcharacters (e.g., symbols and/or alphanumeric characters). Users of themembers may communicate the group agreed seed in person, over the phone,via postal mail, or using any other alternative communication channel.Each member may independently submit the group agreed seed to thesecurity application. When prompted, the user of each member may enterthe group agreed seed in a field of the user interface of the securityapplication.

In Step 221, a second message digest is generated using the group agreedseed as input into the n-bit generator. Specifically, the encryptionmodule calls the n-bit generator using the group agreed seed as theinput value. The n-bit generators of each of the members performs thesame one or more functions for all of the members of the group. Thus,the same message digest (i.e., the second message digest) is generatedby all members of the group.

In Step 223, secrets are obtained from the second message digest.Specifically, the encryption module identifies each portion of thesecond message digest relating to a secret. The following examples arenot intended to limit the scope of the invention. Turning to an example,in a 512-bit message digest, bits in bit positions 0-127 may correspondto the static secret, bits in bit position corresponding to 128-383 maycorrespond to the dynamic secret and the final 128 bits may correspondto discard bits that remain unused or to a change (increment) value tobe included as an input to an iterative pass of the n-bit generator. Inthe example, the security application extracts the static secret byobtaining the first 128 bits of the message digest and extracts thedynamic secret by obtaining the next 256 bits. As discussed, the aboveis only an example. For example, the ordering of the static secrets,dynamic secret, and discard bits may be different from the previousexample, the discard bits may be omitted, the static secret or a portionthereof may be in different message digests, the dynamic secret or aportion thereof may be in different message digests, or one of thesecrets may be omitted. In one or more embodiments of the invention,each security application extracts the same bits for each of thesecrets. Thus, each member of the group generates the same set ofsecrets.

As another example for extracting secrets, bits in the message digestmay indicate the starting position of each of the secrets. For example,the first four bits low order or least significant of the message digestmay be used as shift bits defining the start of a secret. In such anexample, the first bit of a secret may start following the shift value.By way of an example, if the shift bits in the message digest is “0001”(or one in base 10), then the secret starts at bit position two. Asanother example, if the shift bits is “1000” (or eight in base 10), thesecret starts a bit 9.

Additional secrets may be generated for the group by repeating Steps 221and 223 using the second message digest (or a portion thereof) andsubsequent message digests (or a portion thereof) as an input to then-bit generator. Alternatively, or additionally, Steps 221 and 223 maybe repeated multiple times to generate a succession of new secrets. Forexample, each subsequent time may use, as input, the message digest fromthe previously time. Alternatively or additionally, additional secretsmay be generated by repeating Steps 203-205 in which new group agreedseeds are used.

In Step 225, the secrets are stored in the secrets file. As discussedabove, each secret may be stored with the unique secret identifierand/or a secrets grouping identifier.

In Step 227, the secrets are encrypted using the secrets file encryptionkey (obtained in Step 213). Specifically, the encryption module appliesan encryption algorithm to the secrets file using the secrets fileencryption key. Thus, the secrets in the secrets file may be protectedeven if the secrets file is identified.

In Step 229, decoy file names and contents are generated for the decoyfiles. Different techniques may be used to create the decoy file namesand contents. For example, the encryption module may request that then-bit generator uses a random character generator to generate a randomset of characters of an identical length as the secrets and secrets filename. As another example, the encryption module may call the n-bitgenerator with pseudo-randomly generated input to create the decoyfiles. As another example, the encryption module may use the finalgenerated secret (e.g., secret(s) obtained in Step 223) with or withoutmodification input as input to the n-bit generator to produce additionalcontent.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, two or three decoy filesare created each time a secrets file is created. More or fewer decoyfiles may be created without departing from the scope of the invention.Further, once the security directory has a threshold number of files(secrets file and decoy files), the encryption module may stop creatingdecoy files in one or more embodiments of the invention.

In Step 231, the decoy files are stored in the security directory withthe secrets file. In one or more embodiments of the invention, thecreation storage of the decoy files is the same time as the creation andstorage of the encrypted secrets file. Thus, the decoy files and thesecrets file have the same timestamps. Those skilled in the art willappreciate that the timestamps on the decoy files and/or the secretsfile may be modified such that all timestamps are the same or within anappropriate range (as defined above).

In Step 233, identifiers of members of the group are received.Specifically, an identifier for each member of the group is received.The identifier may be a unique identifier, a nickname, or anotheridentifier.

In Step 235, connection information to create a secure connection toeach member of the group is received. Specifically, the connectioninformation identifies how to access the member through a securecommunication channel if it exists. Alternatively, the connectioninformation may specify general contact information, such as a phonenumber, an internet protocol (IP) address, or other contact information.In Step 237, the connection information is stored with the identifiersfor the group. The connection information and the identifiers may bestored in a separate file, such as a configuration file associated withthe security application. Further, the same connection information maybe used by the member for multiple groups that have common members.

Although not shown in FIGS. 2A-2B, additional groups may be added byrepeating Steps 205-237 for each group. In one or more embodiments ofthe invention, when a new group is created, the timestamps of allexisting files are updated to match the new group. The timestamps may beupdated, for example, using APIs provided by the operating system toforce an update of the timestamps.

FIG. 3 shows a flowchart for communicating between members of the groupin one or more embodiments of the invention. In Step 231, a request forgroup communication is received. The request may be received from theuser using the member, an application executing on the member orexecuting on a computer system connected to the member, another member,etc.

For example, the user may start the security application and select agroup using the group name to start sending communications. The user mayalso select the application (e.g., email application, chat application,etc.) that the user will use for the communication. In response, thesecurity application may access the connection information for othermembers of the group and send an invite to the other members using theconnection information. The invite may include the group agreed connectname and indicate that the member is starting a communication sessionfor the group having the specified connect name. Additionally, oralternatively, the invite may be sent with the first communication fromthe member.

As a second example, the user may use an application (e.g., a emailapplication, a chat application, an Internet browser) to start acommunication session with another user. The security application mayintercept the user's connection request, identify the members of thegroup corresponding to the recipient users, and invite the other membersof the group to the communication session using the group agreed connectname and the connection information for the other members.

As a third example, the request for group communication may be initiatedby the security application receiving an invite to the communicationsession from another member of the group. In response, the securityapplication may notify the user that a communication session isrequested in accordance with one or more embodiments of the invention.

The above are only some examples of how a request for communication isreceived. The request for communication may be received in other mannerwithout departing from the scope of the invention.

In Step 233, user credentials are received. In one or more embodimentsof the invention, the member prompts the user to provide the usercredentials. For example, the user interface of the security applicationmay display one or more input boxes for the user to submit the user'scredentials.

In Step 235, the n-bit generator generates the secrets file name and thesecrets file encryption key using the user's credentials and the groupagreed connect name. Specifically, the n-bit generator generates amessage digest having the secrets file name and the secrets fileencryption key using the aforementioned inputs. The encryption moduleextracts the aforementioned components from the message digest.Generating the message digest and extracting the secrets file encryptionkey may be performed as discussed above with reference to Steps 211 and213 in FIG. 2.

In Step 237, a determination is made whether a matching file name isfound in the security directory. If a matching file name is found, thenthe user's credentials are correct and the secrets file is identified.If the matching file name is not found, then the received user'scredentials may be incorrect. The security application may allow theuser to re-submit the credentials and/or deny access to the user.

In Step 239, if the matching file name is found, the secrets file isdecrypted using the secrets file encryption key. Specifically, theencryption module applies the encryption algorithm to the encryptedsecrets file (i.e., the file identified in Step 237) using the secretsfile encryption key to create a decrypted secrets file.

In Step 241, the secrets are obtained from the decrypted secrets file.In one or more embodiments of the invention, the secrets may be obtainedbased on the type of unique secret identifier and/or a secrets groupingidentifier. For example, the communication request may specify anapplication used in the communication. Accordingly, encryption modulemay identify the secrets grouping identifier corresponding to thespecified application. The encryption module obtains the secrets fromthe secrets file having the specified secrets grouping identifier.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, rather than opening thesecrets file to obtain the secrets, the secrets file may be copied to atemporary memory location, such as cache memory, and the copy may beopened to obtain the secrets. Thus, if the dynamic secrets are notupdated at the end of the communication session, then the metadata ofthe secrets file remains unchanged. When the metadata of the secretsfile remains unchanged, then the metadata of the decoy files does notneed to change. Further, the contents of the temporary memory locationmay be destroy so as to destroy the copy of the secrets file. Thedestruction may include overwriting the temporary location multipletimes in accordance with one or more embodiments of the invention.

As another example, the communication request may include the uniquesecret identifier. In the example, the encryption module may extract thesecret having the unique secrets identifier from the secrets file.

By way of another example, the encryption module may randomly selectsecrets (e.g., a static and dynamic secret) and send the unique secretsidentifier of the randomly selected secrets to the other members of thegroup.

The above are only a few examples for obtaining secrets from the secretsfile. Other methods may be used without departing from the scope of theinvention.

In Step 243, the n-bit generator generates one or more message digestsusing the secrets. Generating one or more message digests is discussedbelow and in FIGS. 4A and 4B.

Continuing with FIG. 3, the encryption module encrypts and decryptscommunications transferred between the members of the group using anencryption key parsed from the message digest. As discussed below, fromthe message digest(s), an encryption key is generated. The encryptionmodule applies the encryption key and an encryption algorithm to eachcommunication for sending to encrypt the communication. The encryptedcommunication is sent to the other members of the group. Similarly, theencryption module applies the encryption key and the encryptionalgorithm to each received communication to decrypt the receivedcommunication.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, the encryption moduleintercepts the communications sent and received from the member to thegroup or from a computer system connected to the member to the group.The encryption module performs the encryption and decryption stepswithout input from and transparently to the user (or other computersystem to which the security application is connected) in one or moreembodiments of the invention.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, the security applicationmay be used for communications between subgroups, in which only some ofthe members are present using the secrets for the group. In one or moreembodiments of the invention, the sub-group may be spawned into a newgroup. Additionally, or alternatively, when only the subgroup iscommunicating, the dynamic secret is not updated for the entire group.

FIGS. 4A and 4B show flowcharts for using the initial message digest togenerate an encryption key. As shown in FIG. 4A, in Step 251, a sharedsecret(s) is obtained from the secrets file. In Step 253, a new messagedigest is generated using the shared secret(s) as inputs for the n-bitgenerator. For example, the encryption module may call the n-bitgenerator and pass the parameters of the shared secret(s).

In Step 255, an encryption key is extracted from the resulting messagedigest. Extracting the encryption key may include the encryption moduleidentifying the bit positions corresponding to the encryption key andseparately storing the series of bits in the identified bit positions asthe encryption key. In addition to extracting the encryption key,algorithm selector bits, key length and other components of the messagedigest may be extracted. The algorithm selector bits may be used, forexample, as an index to the algorithm selector table to identify anencryption algorithm to use to encrypt the communications.

FIG. 4B shows another example flowchart for using the initial messagedigest. Specifically, FIG. 4B shows an example for generating multiplemessage digests, where each message digest includes some of thecomponents for encrypting a communication. In Step 257, the sharedsecret and dynamic secret are obtained from the secrets file. Obtainingthe shared secret and the dynamic secret may be performed as discussedabove.

In Step 259, a second message digest is generated using the sharedsecret and the dynamic secret as inputs for the n-bit generator.Generating the second message digest may be performed in a similarmanner to that discussed above with reference to Step 253 in FIG. 4A.

In Step 261, the change value and other components are extracted fromthe second message digest. Extracting the components may be performed ina manner similar to the extraction of the encryption key as discussedabove in Step 255 of FIG. 4A. The other components that are extractedmay include, for example, the most significant bits of the encryptionkey, the least significant bits of the encryption key, the algorithmselector bits, etc.

In Step 263 of FIG. 4B, the change value is combined with the dynamicsecret to create an interim dynamic secret. Combining the change valuewith the dynamic secret may be performed, for example, by a bitshuffler. Specifically, any of the operations discussed above withrespect to the bit shuffler may be performed to combine the change valuewith the dynamic secret. In one or more embodiments of the invention, aprime number is added to the change value or result to account for apossibility that the change value may be zero. For example, thecombination may be the change value XOR'd with the dynamic secret plusone.

In Step 265, a third message digest is generated using the interimdynamic secret and the static secret as inputs to the n-bit generator.Step 265 may be performed, for example, in a manner similar to the abovediscussion with reference to Step 259. In one or more embodiments of theinvention, rather than performing Step 263 to create an interim dynamicsecret and then performing Step 265 to generate a third message digestusing the interim dynamic secret, the third message digest may begenerated using the change value, the dynamic secret, and the staticsecrets as inputs into the n-bit generator.

In Step 267, the change value and other components are extracted fromthe third message digest in accordance with one or more embodiments ofthe invention. Extracting the change value and the other components maybe in a manner similar to the above discussion with reference to Step261.

In Step 269, a determination is made whether to create another messagedigest. In one or more embodiments of the invention, each securityapplication is configured to create an identical number of messagedigests. Additional message digests may be generated to createadditional bits for an encryption key or to create additionalcomponents.

If a determination is made to create an additional message digest, thenthe steps repeat starting with Step 263. In Step 263, the change valueextracted in Step 267 is used with the dynamic secret to create a newinterim dynamic secret. Alternatively, rather than using the dynamicsecret for subsequent message digests, the previously created interimdynamic secret may be used.

Alternatively, if a determination is made not to create another messagedigest, an encryption solution is created from the components of themessage digests in Step 271. For example, the least significant bits ofthe encryption key may be combined with the most significant bits of theencryption key to create a single encryption key. The encryptionsolution may be used to encrypt and decrypt communications. Encrypting acommunication may be performed for example, by accessing the algorithmselector table to identify the encryption algorithm corresponding to thealgorithm selector bits in the message digest. The communication to beencrypted is encrypted by applying the identified encryption algorithmwith the encryption key to the communication. The resulting encryptedcommunication may be sent to the members and/or stored (e.g., stored ona local or remote storage device). In one or more embodiments of theinvention, when an encrypted communication is stored, dynamic secretsare not used to create the encryption key used to encrypt thecommunication.

During or at the end of a session, the members of a group may agree tochange the encryption key and/or the dynamic secret values. For example,the agreement may be based on a signal passed between the members whenone of the members elects that the encryption key should change. Asanother example, the agreement may be based on a pre-agreed period atwhich a new encryption key is generated. For example, the members mayagree that a new encryption key should be generated every five minutes,with every 20 communications, after 256K bits are exchanged, etc.

FIG. 5A shows a flowchart for changing an encryption key. In Step 281, achange of encryption key is initiated by the group or one of the membersthereof. As discussed above, the initiation may be based on a message, apre-agreed period, etc.

In Step 283, intermediate results of the last performance of the n-bitgenerator and the last generated change value are obtained. As discussedabove, the intermediate results may correspond to the output of the bitshuffler prior to performing the hash function. Further, each member mayextract the change value from the last generated message digest.

In Step 285, each member generates a new message digest using theintermediate results and the last change value as inputs to the n-bitgenerator. In Steps 283 and 285, rather than using the intermediateresults, the dynamic secret, the dynamic secret and the static secret,or the interim dynamic secret may be used in accordance with one or moreembodiments of the invention.

In Step 287, a new encryption key is extracted from the new messagedigest. Extracting the new encryption key may be performed as discussedabove with reference to Step 255 of FIG. 4A. After the new encryptionkey is extracted the new encryption key may be used to encrypt anddecrypt communications between the members of the group. In one or moreembodiments of the invention, the encryption key could be an encryptionsolution. The encryption solution may include, for example, theencryption key, algorithm selector bits for selecting an encryptionalgorithm, and/or other components used for encryption.

FIG. 5B shows an example flowchart for changing the dynamic secretvalues at the end of a communication session in accordance with one ormore embodiments of the invention. In Step 289, a communication sessionis finalized with the group. For example, the group members may send amessage ending the communication session. Each member may wait until themember receives confirmation from all other members of the group.

In Step 291, the initial dynamic secret and the final change value usedin the communication session are obtained. For example, the initialdynamic secret may be the secret generated in the initial message digestor a secret stored in the secrets repository. The final change value maycorrespond to the last generated change value. For example, the finalchange value may be obtained as discussed above with reference to Step283 in FIG. 5A.

Continuing with FIG. 5B, in Step 293, a new message digest is generatedusing the initial dynamic secret and the change value as inputs to then-bit generator. In Step 295, the new dynamic secret is extracted fromthe new message digest. The new dynamic secret may replace the initialdynamic secret in the secrets file. Specifically, in Step 297, eachmember of the group may store the new dynamic secret in theircorresponding secrets repository. Because each member generates andstores the same new dynamic secret, the members use the same secrets inthe next communication session.

Further, each member updates the secrets files and the decoy files toupdate the file time stamps in Step 299. Specifically, each files may beopened, modified, and closed. The modification may be changing acharacter into a new randomly generated character and saving the changeddecoy file. As another example, the modification may be writing acharacter to the decoy file, saving the decoy file, and then removingthe character from the decoy file and the secrets files. In one or moreembodiments of the invention, the update to the secrets file isperformed after some of the decoy files are updated and prior to thefinal decoy files are updated. By modifying the decoy files when thesecrets file is modified, the timestamps of the decoy files may beautomatically updated. Rather than performing the modification, themetadata of the files may be updated by manipulating the metadatadirectly, such as through an API of an operating system, or accessingthe metadata. Thus, a nefarious user or computer system could not accessthe modification timestamp to identify the secrets file.

FIGS. 6A-6B shows an example communication session in accordance withone or more embodiments of the invention. The following is for examplepurposes only. In the following example, consider the scenario in whichOpal and Andrew want to communicate via a chat application. Opal'scomputing device is an external token device that connects to a computersystem that includes a chat application. Opal's token executes thesecurity application and includes the secrets file. Opal's computingdevice is referred to below as the originating member. Similarly,Andrew's computing device is a smart phone that has a chat applicationand a security application. Andrew's smart phone is referred to below asthe answering member.

In the example, Opal opens her chat application on her computer systemand connects her token to the computer system. Opal selects Andrew asthe recipient of the communication. The chat application sends a requestto the token to open a communication session with Andrew. The securityapplication executing on the token receives the request and obtains thegroup agreed connect name for the group having only Opal and Andrew. Thesecurity application also identifies the connection information forAndrew. The security application sends Andrew a communication request tocommunicate via chat.

FIGS. 6A-6B shows flowcharts from the perspective of the answeringmember (i.e., Andrew's smart phone). Starting with FIG. 6A, in Step 301,the answering member receives a communication request to communicateusing a chat application. Specifically, Andrew's smart phone receives,from Opal's token, a request specifying the group agreed connect name,and an identifier of a chat session. Accordingly, in Step 303, the groupagreed connect name is obtained from the communication request.

In Step 305, the answering member informs Andrew of the communicationrequest. Specifically, the security application on the smart phone mayhave a notification mechanism, such as an icon, ring tone, or othernotification mechanism, that informs Andrew that a communication requestis received. At this stage, Andrew may decide whether to accept orreject the communication request. If Andrew rejects the communicationrequest, then the answering member ends the communication session withOpal. (not shown)

However, if Andrew accepts the communication request, then Andrewsubmits his username and password. Accordingly, in Step 307, theanswering system receives a username and password from Andrew.

In Step 309, the n-bit generator executing on the answering systemgenerates a first message digest using the username, password, and thegroup agreed connect name as inputs. For example, the n-bit generatormay XOR the username, password, and group agreed connect name to createan intermediate result. The intermediate result may be input to an MD5hash function to create a pseudo-random string as the first messagedigest.

In Step 311, the answering member extracts the secrets file name and thesecrets file encryption key from the first message digest. The secretsfile name may be, in the example, the last 128 bits of the first messagedigest and the secrets file encryption key may be, in the example, thefirst 256 bits of the message digest. Based on the extracted secretsfile name, the answering member identifies the secrets file on Andrew'ssmart phone. Because the first message digest is a pseudo-random bitstring, the secrets file name is also pseudo random and can only beidentified if the username, group agreed identifier, and password arecorrect. Thus, by finding the secrets file name, the securityapplication authenticates Andrew as the user of the smart phone.Alternatively, the smart phone might verify the user name and passwordindependent of the secure chat application.

In Step 313, the answering member decrypts the identified secrets fileusing the secrets file encryption key. Specifically, the answeringmember uses the secrets file encryption key and a symmetric encryptionalgorithm to decrypt the secrets file. From the decrypted secrets file,the answering member extracts the secrets corresponding to the chatapplication in Step 315. For example, the answering member may identifythat the fifth secret is the secret corresponding to the chatapplication based on a pre-defined configuration parameter or anidentifier stored with the fifth secret which is 384 bits and thebeginning bit is bit 84.

Continuing with FIG. 6B, in Step 317, the n-bit generator on theanswering system generates a second message digest using the secret. Theanswering system's encryption module may extract from the fifth secret,the dynamic secret and the static secret and provide the dynamic secretand the static secret as inputs to the n-bit generator. The n-bitgenerator combines the dynamic secret and the static secret to producethe second message digest. For example, the initial message digest maycorrespond to message digest (350) shown in example FIG. 6C. Referringto FIG. 6C, a message digest (350) may include an originating member'sone-time password (352), discard bits (354), an encryption key mostsignificant bits (356), and a change value (358).

The originating member's one-time password (352) is a series of bitsgenerated by the n-bit generator for the answering member toauthenticate the originating member. Specifically, because both theoriginating member and the answering member generate the same messagedigest (e.g., example message digest (350)), the originating member'sone-time password (352) is the same for the first member and the secondmember. Accordingly, if the first member's one-time password (352) thatthe first member sends to the second member is identical to the secondmember's generated first member's one time password, then the secondmember knows that the first member is authentic. Specifically, the firstmember knows that the second member received the same input and had ann-bit generator that was capable of performing the same operations.Further, in one or more embodiments, once the first member and secondmember passwords have been confirmed, an extremely high probabilityexists that the other corresponding bits of the message digest alsomatch between systems.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, prior to sending theone-time passwords, the one-time passwords are encrypted using anencryption algorithm and an encryption key. In such embodiments, theone-time passwords are sent encrypted. The receiver may encrypt theirgenerated one-time password and compared the encrypted generatedone-time password with the received one-time password. As analternative, the receiver may decrypt the received one-time password andthen compare the decrypted one-time password with the generated one-timepassword.

Discard bits (354) are bits that are ignored when creating theencryption solution. Specifically, discard bits are bits that preventthe nefarious user or computer system from understanding the messagedigest. By having discard bits, the nefarious user or computer systemmay be unable to ascertain which bits are actually used for theencryption solution.

The session encryption key most significant bits (MSB) (356) correspondto a portion of the encryption key. Specifically, the encryption key maybe divided into one or more parts. A portion of the encryption key maybe located in a first message digest while a second portion is locatedin another message digest. Because all members use the instances of thesame n-bit generator to generate the message digests, the encryption keygenerated by each of the members is the same. Thus, the encryption keydoes not need to be communicated between the members. Moreover, theencryption key may be stored in the security application and notprovided through any interface to any user. Thus, members (and users ofthe members) that leave the group remain unaware of the encryption keyused to encrypt the data.

In one or more embodiments of the invention, a change value (358)provides a pseudo-random value to spawn a new message digest. Forexample, the change value may be used to create a new encryption key orcreate a new dynamic secret. Further, the stored secrets may be inputtedto the n-bit generator to spawn temporary use secrets. All of thespawned secrets are used only during a session in accordance with one ormore embodiments of the invention. After the session, the spawnedsecrets are destroyed so as to be no longer accessible or otherwiseobtainable through any nefarious methods. Similar to the temporary usesecrets, the change value is destroyed once combined with theappropriate dynamic secret value.

Returning to the example message digest (350), FIG. 6C is only oneexample of the components of a message digest. Some of the componentsmay be removed while other components may be added.

Returning to FIG. 6B, in Step 319, the encryption module on theanswering system extracts the originating member's one time password,the encryption key's most significant bits, and a change value from thesecond message digest. The extracted change value is combined with theoriginal dynamic secret in Step 321 to create an interim dynamic secretin the example. The interim dynamic secret may be obtained by performingan XOR operation on the change value and the original dynamic secretplus one.

Using the interim dynamic secret, the n-bit generator generates thethird message digest in Step 323. For example, the initial messagedigest may correspond to message digest (360) shown in example FIG. 6D.Referring to FIG. 6D, a message digest (360) may include an answeringmember's one-time password (362), discard bits (364), an encryption keyleast significant bits (366), and a change value (368). The answeringmember's one-time password (362), discard bits (364), an encryption keyleast significant bits (366), and a change value (368) are similar tothe originating member's one-time password (352), discard bits (354), anencryption key most significant bits (356), and a change value (358) inFIG. 6C.

Specifically, the answering member's one-time password (362) is a seriesof bits generated by the n-bit generator for the originating member toauthenticate the answering member. Discard bits (364) are bits that areignored when creating the encryption solution. The session encryptionkey least significant bits (LSB) (366) correspond to a second portion ofthe encryption key. The change value (368) provides a random value tocreate a new message digest.

Returning to the example message digest (360), FIG. 6D is only oneexample of the components of a message digest. Some of the componentsmay be removed while other components may be added.

Returning to FIG. 6B, the answering member extracts the answeringmember's one-time password, the encryption key's least significant bits,the change value from the third message digest.

Although not discussed above, after the originating member finds thesecrets file located on the originating member, the originating memberperforms the same steps as the answering member. Thus, both theoriginating member and the answering member generate the second andthird message digests. The answering member sends the answering member'sone-time password to the originating member in Step 327. The originatingmember sends the originating member's one-time password to the answeringmember. Accordingly, the answering member receives the originatingmember's one-time password in Step 329.

Both the originating member and the answering member compare thereceived one-time password with the generated one-time password todetermine if the received password is identical to the generatedpassword. For example, in Step 331, the answering member determineswhether the received originating member's one-time password is equal tothe generated originating member's one-time password. If the twopasswords are not equal, then the answering member may stopcommunication with the originating member. Similarly, although notshown, the originating member determines whether the received answeringmember's one-time password is equal to the generated answering member'sone-time password. If the two passwords are not equal, then theoriginating member may stop communication with the answering member.

However, in Step 333, if the passwords are equal, then the encryptionkey's most significant bits are concatenated with the encryption key'sleast significant bits to create the encryption key.

At this stage, Opal and Andrew may start communicating via the chatapplication. The encryption modules intercept each outgoingcommunication and encrypt it using the encryption key in Step 335.Similarly, the encryption modules intercept each incoming communicationand decrypt it using the encryption key (not shown). Further, Steps 301,303, and 309-335 in FIGS. 6A and 6B may be performed transparently toboth Opal and Andrew. Thus, neither Opal nor Andrew need to be aware ofthe encryption. Further, in one or more embodiments of the invention,both Opal and Andrew cannot view the secrets or the encryption key.Thus, neither Opal nor Andrew can consciously or unconsciously provide anefarious user with access to the shared secrets.

FIGS. 7A-7E show an example in accordance with one or more embodimentsof the invention. The following example is for example purposes only andnot intended to limit the scope of the invention. FIG. 7A-7C show anexample user interface for the configuration utility in accordance withone or more embodiments of the invention.

As shown in FIG. 7A, the initial configuration utility window (400)includes an input box for the user to specify the location of thesecurity directory (402) and an input box for the user to specify alocation for storing a database about users (404). Input box (402) andinput box (404) may be constrained such that only a user correspondingto an administrator can change the location. Alternatively, oradditionally, the input box (402) and input box (404) may be constrainedso that the user can only provide locations that are on the memberitself.

Additionally, in the example, the initial configuration utility window(400) includes a user manager (406). The user manager (406) allows auser to enter data specific to the user. Specifically, a user name inputbox (408) and password input box (410) allows the user to enter theusername and password, respectively, that the user will use each timethe user uses the security application. The user may be prompted tore-enter the user password in an input box (not shown) to verify thatthe user entered his/her intended password.

Text box (412) provides a list of groups with whom the user maycommunicate. Specifically, text box (412) shows a list of the groupsthat the member has already added. Entries in the list may be displayedas a nickname of the group, the connect name, or other informationuseful to the user.

Check box (414), nick name input box (416), connect name input box(418), and connect input box (420) allows the user to submit data for aspecific group. For example, if selected, check box (414) designatesthat the group includes more than two members. The user may submit thenick name of the group in the nick name input box (416). The user maysubmit the group agreed connect name of the group in the connect nameinput box (418). The user may submit the connection information for thegroup in the connect input box (420). The connect input box (420) may beused for providing the connection information for the entire group. Ifthe check box (414) is selected, the user interface may displayadditional input boxes to allow a user to submit nick names andconnection information for each member of the group. The additionalinput boxes may be displayed to provide member specific connectioninformation.

Continuing with the example, FIG. 7B shows a user interface window (422)for submitting the group agreed seed. Specifically, the user interfacewindow (422) may be displayed while the user is adding a new group inone or more embodiments of the invention. The user may enter the groupagreed seed in input box (424) and select okay (426) to submit the groupagreed seed.

In response to the user entering the group and/or the user'sinformation, the user interface may display the window (428) shown inFIG. 7C to show that the group has been added. Thus, the secrets filefor the group may be generated.

FIG. 7D shows an example schematic diagram for generating the secretsfile name and encryption key/solution. As shown in FIG. 7D, the username(430) that the user submitted in the username input box (408 in FIG.7A), the password (432) that the user submitted in the password inputbox (410 in FIG. 7A), and the group agreed connect name (434) that theuser submitted in connect name input box (418) are provided as inputs tothe n-bit generator (436).

With the inputs, the n-bit generator (436) produces message digest(438). The message digest includes a secrets file name (440) and asecrets file encryption key (442). Accordingly, secrets created usingthe group agreed seed submitted in input box (424 in FIG. 7B) are storedin a secrets file, which is saved with secrets file name (440). Thesecrets file encryption key (442) is used to encrypt the secrets file.Accordingly, the secrets file is stored in the secrets file directory.

FIG. 7E shows an example file interface window (444) showing the secretsfiles directory (referred as key files in FIG. 7E) (446). As shown inthe example, the contents of the secrets file directory (448) includesthe secrets file and decoy files. However, because the secrets file nameand the decoy file names are pseudo-random strings of characters and thesecrets file and the decoy files have the same metadata, the secretsfile is indistinguishable from the decoy files. For example, thesecurity application may use the n-bit generator and similar proceduresto generate the secrets as to generate the decoy files. In the example,the encryption module may call the n-bit generator four times to producethe desired number of secrets bits, and, therefore, times to produce thesufficient bits for each of ten decoy files. As another example, theencryption module may request fifty iterations of the n-bit generator toproduce the decoy files and the secrets file. Because the decoy files inthe example are similarly produced so as to be indistinguishable, thenefarious computer system or user could not identify the secrets filebased on the information provided in the list of files in the fileinterface window (444).

Embodiments of the invention may be implemented on virtually any type ofcomputer system regardless of the platform being used. The computingdevice may be the computer system, execute on the computer system, be anexternal device of the computer system, etc. For example, as shown inFIG. 8, a computer system (500) includes one or more computingprocessor(s) (502), associated memory (504) (e.g., random access memory(RAM), cache memory, flash memory, etc.), an internal and/or externalstorage device (506) (e.g., a hard disk, an optical drive such as acompact disk drive or digital video disk (DVD) drive, a flash memorystick, universal serial bus (USB) drive, smart card, smart phone, etc.),and numerous other elements and functionalities typical of today'scomputers (not shown). The computer system (500) may also include inputmeans, such as a keyboard (508), a touch screen (512), a mouse (510), ora microphone (not shown). Further, the computer system (500) may includeoutput means, such as a monitor (512) (e.g., a liquid crystal display(LCD), a plasma display, or cathode ray tube (CRT) monitor). Thecomputer system (500) may be connected to a network (514) (e.g., a localarea network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN) such as the Internet, orany other type of network) via a network interface connection; wired orwireless (not shown). Those skilled in the art will appreciate that manydifferent types of computer systems exist, and the aforementioned inputand output means may take other forms. Generally speaking, the computersystem (500) includes at least the minimal processing, input, and/oroutput means necessary to practice embodiments of the invention.

Computer readable program code to perform embodiments of the inventionmay be stored on a computer readable medium such as a compact disc (CD),a diskette, a tape, physical memory, or any other physical computerreadable storage medium that includes functionality to store computerreadable program code to perform embodiments of the invention. In oneembodiment of the invention the computer readable program code, whenexecuted by a processor(s), is configured to perform embodiments of theinvention.

While the invention has been described with respect to a limited numberof embodiments, those skilled in the art, having benefit of thisdisclosure, will appreciate that other embodiments can be devised whichdo not depart from the scope of the invention as disclosed herein.Accordingly, the scope of the invention should be limited only by theattached claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for protecting a secrets file,comprising: initiating configuration of a group; obtaining a groupagreed connect name corresponding to the group; obtaining a username andpassword of a user of a member of the group; generating a first messagedigest using the group agreed connect name, the username, the password,and an n-bit generator; extracting a secrets file name and a secretsfile encryption key from the first message digest; obtaining a groupagreed seed for a secrets file; generating a second message digest usingthe group agreed seed and the n-bit generator; extracting a first secretfrom the second message digest; encrypting, using the secrets fileencryption key, the secrets file in a security directory, wherein thesecrets file is associated with the secrets file name, and wherein thesecrets file comprises the first secret; generating a third messagedigest using the first secret; extracting a first decoy file name andfirst decoy file contents from the third message digest; creating afirst decoy file using the first decoy file name and the first decoyfile contents; and storing the first decoy file in the securitydirectory, wherein the security directory comprises a plurality of decoyfiles comprising the first decoy file, and wherein each of the pluralityof decoy files comprises decoy file contents, wherein each of theplurality of decoy files are a same size as the secrets file.
 2. Themethod of claim 1, wherein the first secret is modified prior togenerating the third message digest.
 3. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising: opening, by the member of the group, a chat applicationbased on a request by the user; initiating, by the chat application, acommunication with the group; transparently to the user and by asecurity application: obtaining the first secret from the secrets file;intercepting a message from the chat application to the group;encrypting, using the first secret, the message from the chatapplication to obtain an encrypted message; and sending the encryptedmessage to the group.
 4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:transparently to the user and by a security application: intercepting areceived encrypted message from the group; obtaining the first secretfrom the secrets file in response to intercepting the received encryptedmessage; decrypting the received encrypted message to obtain a receivedmessage; and sending the received message to a chat application; andopening, by the chat application, the received message.
 5. The method ofclaim 1, further comprising: storing a plurality of secrets in thesecrets file, wherein the plurality of secrets comprises the firstsecret, and wherein the plurality of secrets is organized according to atype of communication associated with each secret of the plurality ofsecrets.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein each of the plurality ofdecoy files is associated with a modification time within a range ofmodification times and a modification time of the secrets file is withinthe range of modification times.
 7. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising: extracting a second secret from the second message digest;storing an encrypted second secret in the secrets file prior toencrypting the secrets file; generating a fourth message digest usingthe first secret and the second secret; and extract an encryption keyfrom the fourth message digest, wherein communication between members ofthe first group are encrypted using the encryption key.
 8. Anon-transitory computer readable medium comprising computer readableprogram code embodied therein for performing a method for protecting asecrets file, the non-transitory computer readable medium comprising:initiating configuration of a group; obtaining a group agreed connectname corresponding to the group; obtaining a username and password of auser of a member of the group; generating a first message digest usingthe group agreed connect name, the username, the password, and an n-bitgenerator; extracting a secrets file name and a secrets file encryptionkey from the first message digest; obtaining a group agreed seed for asecrets file; generating a second message digest using the group agreedseed and the n-bit generator; extracting a first secret from the secondmessage digest; encrypting, using the secrets file encryption key, thesecrets file in a security directory, wherein the secrets file isassociated with the secrets file name, and wherein the secrets filecomprises the first secret; generating a third message digest using thefirst secret; extracting a first decoy file name and first decoy filecontents from the third message digest; creating a first decoy fileusing the first decoy file name and the first decoy file contents; andstoring the first decoy file in the security directory, wherein thesecurity directory comprises a plurality of decoy files comprising thefirst decoy file, and wherein each of the plurality of decoy filescomprises decoy file contents, wherein each of the plurality of decoyfiles are a same size as the secrets file.
 9. The non-transitorycomputer readable medium of claim 8, wherein the first secret ismodified prior to generating the third message digest.
 10. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8, wherein the methodfurther comprises: transparently to the user and by a securityapplication: obtaining the first secret from the secrets file;intercepting a message from a chat application to the group; encrypting,using the first secret, the message from the chat application to obtainan encrypted message; and sending the encrypted message to the group.11. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8, wherein themethod further comprises: transparently to the user and by a securityapplication: intercepting a received encrypted message from the group;obtaining the first secret from the secrets file in response tointercepting the received encrypted message; decrypting the receivedencrypted message from the chat application to obtain a receivedmessage; and sending the received message to a chat application.
 12. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8, wherein the methodfurther comprises: storing a plurality of secrets in the secrets file,wherein the plurality of secrets comprises the first secret, and whereinthe plurality of secrets is organized according to a type ofcommunication associated with each secret of the plurality of secrets.13. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8, wherein eachof the plurality of decoy files is associated with a modification timewithin a range of modification times and a modification time of thesecrets file is within the range of modification times.
 14. Thenon-transitory computer readable medium of claim 8, wherein the methodfurther comprises: extracting a second secret from the second messagedigest; storing an encrypted second secret in the secrets file prior toencrypting the secrets file; generating a fourth message digest usingthe first secret and the second secret; and extract an encryption keyfrom the fourth message digest, wherein communication between members ofthe first group are encrypted using the encryption key.
 15. A computingdevice for protecting a secrets file comprising: a processor; a memory;and software instructions stored in the memory for causing the computingdevice to: initiate configuration of a group; obtain a group agreedconnect name corresponding to the group; obtain a username and passwordof a user of a member of the group; generate a first message digestusing the group agreed connect name, the username, the password, and ann-bit generator; extract a secrets file name and a secrets fileencryption key from the first message digest; obtain a group agreed seedfor a secrets file; generate a second message digest using the groupagreed seed and the n-bit generator; extract a first secret from thesecond message digest; encrypt, using the secrets file encryption key,the secrets file in a security directory, wherein the secrets file isassociated with the secrets file name, and wherein the secrets filecomprises the first secret; generate a third message digest using thefirst secret; extract a first decoy file name and first decoy filecontents from the third message digest; create a first decoy file usingthe first decoy file name and the first decoy file contents; and storethe first decoy file in the security directory, wherein the securitydirectory comprises a plurality of decoy files comprising the firstdecoy file, and wherein each of the plurality of decoy files comprisesdecoy file contents, wherein each of the plurality of decoy files are asame size as the secrets file.
 16. The computing device of claim 15,further comprising software instructions stored in the memory forcausing the computing device to: open, by the member of the group, achat application based on a request by the user; initiate, by the chatapplication, a communication with the group; transparently to the userand by a security application: obtain the first secret from the secretsfile; intercept a message from the chat application to the group;encrypt, using the first secret, the message from the chat applicationto obtain an encrypted message; and send the encrypted message to thegroup.
 17. The computing device of claim 15, further comprising softwareinstructions stored in the memory for causing the computing device to:transparently to the user and by a security application: intercept areceived encrypted message from the group; obtain the first secret fromthe secrets file in response to intercepting the received encryptedmessage; decrypt the received encrypted message from the chatapplication to obtain a received message; and send the received messageto a chat application; and open, by the chat application, the receivedmessage.
 18. The computing device of claim 15, further comprisingsoftware instructions stored in the memory for causing the computingdevice to: store a plurality of secrets in the secrets file, wherein theplurality of secrets comprises the first secret, and wherein theplurality of secrets is organized according to a type of communicationassociated with each secret of the plurality of secrets.
 19. Thecomputing device of claim 15, further comprising software instructionsstored in the memory for causing the computing device to: extract asecond secret from the second message digest; store the encrypted secondsecret in the secrets file prior to encrypting the secrets file;generate a fourth message digest using the first secret and the secondsecret; and extract an encryption key from the fourth message digest,wherein communication between members of the first group are encryptedusing the encryption key.